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There is a small but nonetheless significant association between parties' activity and their electoral performance (Johnston and Pattie, 2003; Karp, Banducci and Bowler, 2008; Fisher and Denver, 2009; André and Depauw, 2016) . Research also suggests that party members in particular make a difference (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992: 195-200) -not surprisingly, perhaps, since it is they who provide a good deal (although not necessarily the bulk [see Fisher, Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2014; Scarrow, 2014: 103-109; Webb, Poletti & Bale, 2017] ) of the voluntary workers who run the phone banks, deliver leaflets, canvass door-to-door in the run-up to the election, and then remind people to vote and even help them get to the polling stations on election day itself.
Indeed, it is these campaign activities -along with contributing funds, playing some role in policy formation, being 'ambassadors in the community', providing a pool of recruits for elected office, and providing a degree of legitimacy for what would otherwise be transparently hollow organisationsthat are at the heart of what members supposedly do for their parties (Scarrow 1994 ).
If members are central to these campaign efforts, then we clearly need to understand what drives their willingness to engage in such activity. That is the aim of this paper. As part of a wider project on contemporary party membership in the UK, we made a point of surveying members within a week or so of the general election in the hope that respondents' recall of what they did during the campaign would be accurate. In this paper, we describe what members do for their parties during the heat of battle and explain what might drive the range of activities they undertake. In particular, we seek to add value to the best-known specific model of activism among party members, the 'General Incentives Model' (GIM), first introduced in the pioneering work of Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson, 1994; Whiteley and Seyd, 1998; Whiteley, Seyd and Billinghurst, 2005) by first testing how the model performs with new modes of online campaigning, as well as with more traditional campaign activities. We show that, while still valuable, the GIM is no longer fully serviceable for an era of social media communication and campaigning. We proceed to reveal how different types of activity are rooted in local and national contexts. Specifically, we demonstrate that it is necessary to distinguish between 'online' and 'offline' forms of campaign activism, since -over and above general incentivescampaigning 'in real life' is driven to a significant extent by local party and constituency factors, whereas online campaigning is not.
Theoretical approach
In attempting to describe and explain the range of campaign activity of British party members we start by briefly describing the General Incentives Model (GIM). Introduced by Seyd and Whiteley (1992) a generation ago, it covered (but was not confined to) campaign activity, and was grounded in the assumption that participation occurs in response to different kinds of incentives. While this model has widely been found to be of use in explaining the decision to join a party (Poletti, Webb & Bale, forthcoming) , and to be active within it -and indeed we will confirm the continuing value of most of its elements in our own data in due course -we would nevertheless argue that we need to go beyond general incentives to gain a fuller understanding of what motivates party members' campaign activism today. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, social media is part and parcel of the repertoire of contemporary political participation, along with more traditional party campaign activities. The use of Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr, Reddit, Instagram and other forms of digital communication mean that it has become increasingly common for citizens to publicise political information and messages on behalf of and about candidates and parties -and of course to discuss them. In this way, they can participate in campaigns in a meaningful way even if the full extent of the effects of online participation remains unclear at present (Di Gennaro & Dutton 2006; Visser and Stolle 2014; Freezel 2016) . On the one hand, this development leads us to wonder whether the GIM is still a valid tool for capturing the incentives that lead members to participate in modern forms of online campaign as well as in more traditional ones. On the other hand, it gives us the chance to better understand the influence of a geographical dimension linked to different types of party experience which might affect these two types of political campaigning.
In comparing offline and online behaviour, it is likely that the GIM does not directly capture the fact that party members who participate in the types of 'offline' participation that have traditionally typified campaigning activityleafletting, attending meetings and hustings, canvassing, and so on -are more likely to be influenced by what happens in their local party and constituency (as opposed to the national party) than those members who only participate online.
Of course, those whose experience of party membership brings them into direct, face-to-face contact with other members will be aware of events that the national party and leadership are involved in; but for the most part they directly experience membership as a local phenomenon. Online participation works in a different way. Since it is possible for individuals to restrict their political participation -even if they are party members -to online activity without undertaking any further forms of engagement, it follows that social media users may generally be less susceptible to the influence of the local political context, and correspondingly be more conditioned by national political factors. The two activities are of course not mutually exclusive, as members who participate offline are most likely to participate online as well. But the opposite is not necessarily the case, so we investigate these two modes of participation separately.
Our general expectation, then, is that local factors will prove to be stronger predictors of offline activism while national factors will be stronger predictors of online activism. After outlining our expectations in more detail and presenting our data, we test this idea first by showing, through Principal Components Analysis (PCA) that there are indeed two distinct types of activism for party members -the online and offline variants -before proceeding to test the predictors of these two types of activism in a series of explanatory models.
Modelling campaign activism: Hypotheses
Our intention here is to test three groups of predictors in relation to current British party memberships, derived, in turn, from the GIM, from national political factors and from local political factors, while controlling for party affiliation and demographic background. Although we do not think of these as alternatives but rather as complements to each other, we will in the first instance examine their respective performances separately. In broad terms, the first key question that we address here is whether the GIM is still able to explain campaign activism in the 21 st century, both offline and online. A second key question is whether, over and above the GIM, national and local factors are able to help explain activism, and whether the results differ significantly for online and offline types.
General Incentives Model (GIM)
The General Incentives Model, a seminal approach to explaining political participation, covered (but was not confined to) campaign activity and was 'grounded in the assumption that participation occurs in response to different kinds of incentives…but it goes beyond a narrowly cast economic analysis of incentives to include emotional attachments to the party, moral concerns, and social norms, variables which lie outside the standard cost-benefit approach to decision-making' (Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson, 1994: 109) . Thus, the model includes incentives for activism such as group efficacy (the respondent's perception of the probability that his or her participation in group activity through the party will achieve a desired collective outcome), selective outcome and process incentives, collective incentives (i.e., desired collective policy outcomes), expressive (or affective) incentives, altruism, the impact of social norms, and the perceived costs of activism (the last of these being a disincentive, properly speaking) (Seyd and Whiteley 1992: 112) . Since each of these incentives was shown to be a significant influence on activism in studies of the Labour (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992) , Conservative (Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson, 1994) and Liberal Democrat parties (Whiteley, Seyd and Billinghurst, 2005) in the 1990s, our starting point is to hypothesize that the same thing will still hold today for both offline and online participation.
However, given that online participation is presumably less costly in terms of time and effort than more traditional offline activities, we also expect that costs of activism will not be a disincentive in participating online. The first of these is perceived ideological incongruence. Does it matter if a member regards himself/herself as ideologically distant from the national party, and if so, how (van Haute and Carty, 2012 ; see also Kölln and Polk, 2017) ? Specifically, we take a cue from John May's (1973) 'law' of curvilinear disparity, which suggests that the most active members of parties are strongly motivated by ideological concerns and likely to be more radical than national party leaders or voters. Although this idea has found (at best) mixed support in the literature (e.g. Norris, 1995; van Holsteyn et al., 2017) , it nevertheless generates the expectation that the more ideologically radical a member sees himself/herself as being with respect to the national party leadership, the more active he or she will be. Beyond ideological radicalism, we would hypothesize that there are also impressions of the national leadership that might impact on the activism of party members. In essence, our argument here is that the more positive an impression a member has of his or her national leader, the more likely he or she is to be a willing activist on behalf of the party. Specifically:
(H2b) The more positively a member feels about the national party leadership's relationship with the membership, the more willing he or she will be to play an active part in the party's campaign.
The third factor we take into account is mobilization by the national party. We hypothesize that if members are recruited directly by the national party, it might help to mobilize their involvement in the campaign -but only in so far as online activism is concerned. This rests on the logic that those who are recruited directly by the party HQ usually first establish contact via the internet nowadays (eg, the party's national website). However, they might lack contact with a face-to-face local network that will motivate them to undertake more traditional types of campaign activity. 
The local factors model
The Local Factors Model is essentially the local counterpart of the National Factors Model, with similar elements of ideological congruence, impressions of local party, and recruitment by local party. In addition, however, we incorporate a fourth element that takes into account the characteristics of the constituency electoral context. We start by returning to the matter of left-right ideology. While H2a above hypothesized that the more radical members perceive themselves to be relative to their national parties in left-right terms, the more likely they are to participate in campaign activity, this will not necessarily hold in respect of members' views of their local party, since the local party can be expected to consist of other active members who will be similarly ideologically radical, at least according to May's Law. We might, therefore, expect a greater sense of left-right proximity to (ie, ideological congruence with) the local party among the most active members. This will not necessarily apply to any model of online activity, however, since direct engagement with local party members is not required for the latter. This leads to the following hypothesis regarding offline activism:
(H3a) The closer a member feels to his or her local party in ideological left-right terms, the more likely he or she is to participate in offline campaign activity (the 'local party ideological congruence hypothesis').
As a counterpart to the national factors hypothesis H2b above, we would also expect that the more positive members' impressions of their local party experiences are, the more likely they will be to participate in the campaign.
However, once again this would not necessarily be a predictor of online activism, since the latter does not require any direct engagement with the local party membership.
(H3b) The more positively a member feels about his or her local party, the more willing he or she will be to participate in offline campaign activity.
Moreover, we assume that those who are recruited directly by the local party will be more likely to become embedded in local party activity from the outset.
They will, therefore, be more likely to experience traditional offline activities such as attending meetings, leafletting and canvassing; again, however, this does not necessarily apply to online activities.
(H3c) If a member has been recruited directly by the local party, he or she is more likely to participate in offline activities.
In terms of local factors, it is also important to take into account one potentially important contextual factor, that of constituency marginality. We know that turnout will generally be highest when 'electoral competition is greatest' (Franklin, 2004: 57) , even though the probability of a single vote being decisive, or pivotal, in a large election is very low. Moreover, voting can be seen as a 'low cost-low benefit' activity (Aldrich 1993) , meaning that even small changes in this probability might have an effect on incentives to participate in an election.
Notwithstanding some evidence that the usual relationship between marginality and turnout was less strong than usual in 2015 (Denver, 2015: 22) , we assume that marginality matters for campaigning because the lower the probability that a party member's political action will affect the electoral outcome at constituency level, the less likely it is that a rational member living in that constituency would campaign (Denver and Hands, 1985; Matsusaka and Palda, 1993; Pattie and Johnston 2005) . This is a logic that again probably only applies to offline campaigning, since it seems likely (at least in the absence of further empirical research on the matter) that the bulk of online activity will focus on national rather than local politics. In our case, looking at post-2015 general electoral campaign data, this logic can be expected to apply only to members of those parties that finished first or second in a constituency in 2010 and which would, therefore, have been afforded a reasonable chance of winning it in 2015. Since Labour and the Conservatives came in the top two places far more often than any of the other parties in 2010, this marginality effect is more likely to be significant for the major two parties than for the smaller parties. Finally, we would add a general expectation that national factors will be a strong predictor of online activism, whereas local factors will prove to be a stronger predictor of offline activism. This is because those who participate in traditional offline campaigning tend to experience the party at the local level, while those who campaign online are likely to focus more on the party at national level given the national nature of most of the political material available on the internet.
(H4) national factors will be stronger in predicting online participation, whereas local factors will be more useful in predicting offline participation In addition to these variables designed to test the hypotheses we add a number of standard demographic and party controls, although we are not substantively interested in such effects in this paper. 1
Data and measures
We surveyed 5696 members of six British parties just after the general election in May 2015. The survey was conducted by YouGov using an online-panel and was funded by the ESRC as part on an ongoing project on party membership in the UK. 2 In order to construct the dependent variables for offline and online campaign activism, we first seek to justify the premise that online and offline activism are different from each other and potentially driven by different motives. In order to verify this we run a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of the nine campaign activities used in our survey: liking a party or candidate on Facebook, tweeting something positive for or about the party or candidate, displaying a poster, delivering party leaflets, attending public meetings, canvassing voters, helping to run a party committee room, driving voters to polling stations and standing as a candidate at national or local level. 3 We find that two latent factors do indeed exist and are clearly distinguished from each other: one includes campaign activity on Facebook and Twitter (the 'online activity factor'), and the other includes all the other campaign activities (the 'offline activity factor'). 4 We then construct an additive scale for each set of activities running from 'no activity during the election campaign' to 'maximal activity during the campaign', these capturing the intensity of party members' offline (0-7) and online (0-2) political campaigning at the 2015 general election respectively. 5 We treat these as count variables and we use them as dependent variables in Negative Binomial and Poisson regression analyses (Long 1997). 6 In both cases, we use robust clustered standard errors at the constituency level. Finally, the model testing for online campaign predictors also controls for offline participation, since we expect those engaged in traditional offline activities to be more likely also to use social media as a means of expressing their political preferences.
Data analysis: Key descriptivesNot surprisingly, perhaps, Table 1 shows us that the campaign activities that are least costly to members in terms of time and effort are those most likely to be reported. This is consistent with previous research on the difference between low-and high-intensity political participation (Whiteley & Seyd 2002) . 'Liking' a post on Facebook, tweeting on Twitter, and displaying party posters in the window are easily done, and roughly a third to a half of all respondents did these things in the 2015 election.
Attending public meetings and delivering leaflets on behalf of a candidate both take more effort since they involve actually leaving the house; but they do not necessarily require any ongoing commitment, and overall between 40% and 45% of our respondents report having done these things. Heavier commitments, like standing for elective office (locally or nationally), running party committee rooms, or 'knocking-up' and driving voters to the polls on election day, attracted far fewer participants, however: under 10% engaged in these activities. Finally, about one-sixth of members (16.3%) admitted to having done nothing at all for their parties during the campaign. The detail of Table 1 is interesting, but it is a little hard to take in at a glance. Therefore, the penultimate row of the same table presents a simple additive index, ordered by party, which summarizes the overall level of activism among respondents during the election. This simply ascribes a score of 1 for each of the 9 activities referred in the table (with the exclusion of the vague category of 'other activities'), and thus runs from a minimum of 0 (for people who do nothing) to 9 (for those who do everything listed). There is actually relatively little variation around the overall sample mean of 2.61. Conservative members score lowest, but even they fall within 0.26 of the overall mean on the scale. The one outlier is the SNP: its members are fully 0.54 above the overall mean -a striking symbol of the surge that enabled the party to take 56 of the 59 Scottish seats at Westminster in 2015 (Mitchell 2015) .
So far, we have seen that, as reported in previous studies of political participation, the activities that require most of people in terms of time and effort are the things they are generally least likely to do (Whiteley, Seyd & Richardson 1994: 74-75) , and that the older, larger, and more institutionalized parties have something of an advantage over the smaller parties in these highcost activities. It is now time to consider the underlying factors that might have driven the patterns of activism that we have recorded.
Model results
We start by running the General Incentives Model first for offline and then for online participation. For each of our dependent variables we then run (1) When it comes to online participation (model 1b), however, a slightly different picture emerges. As expected, after controlling for members who also participate offline, the perception of costs of activism is no longer significant.
For most people, the cost of online activism is trivial and activities such as liking something from the party on Facebook can be carried out very quickly and easily. As with offline participation, collective incentives and altruism are not significant, but we also find that selective outcome incentives and social norms are not significant. In other words, only group efficacy, selective process and expressive incentives seem to be helpful predictors of more online participation. So, online activity helps people express their political identities, a process that helps them to feel they are engaging with like-minded people, albeit 'only' via social media, and encourages the belief that they might be contributing effectively to a collective effort in communicating messages favourable to their preferred parties. Thus, although we can largely confirm H1 for offline participation, this is somewhat less true for online participation. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that the GIM was developed before the advent of the internet and political communication via social media, so it is less able to capture the incentives for new types of party activism. Even so, elements of it remain useful.
Looking at demographic controls we can also see that being middle aged is a predictor of more activism, regardless of whether this is carried out offline or online. Interestingly, however, whereas offline activism is still mainly characterized by highly educated, high social grade males who have joined the party some time ago, online activism (once we control for those who also participate offline) is characterized by females who joined the party more recently.
Moving to the innovative models we introduce in this paper (Table 3) , the National Factors model (Model 2) reveals that self-perceived ideological radicalism relative to the national party -for left-leaning parties and rightleaning parties -increases both online and offline campaign activity. In other words, those who participate in election campaigns tend to see themselves as more ideologically radical than their national parties than those who do not. Thus, our 'May's Law' hypothesis (H2a) can be accepted. A positive view of the membership's relationship with the national party leadership is also important for both offline and online campaigning (confirming H2b). Finally, joining the party after being approached by the national party reduces the likelihood of participation in offline campaigning compared to members who joined either on their own initiative or after being prompted by a local party. While this is consistent with H2c, the fact that recruitment by the national party does not affect online campaigning is a null finding.
All our expectations of the Local Factors model (Model 3) relate to offline campaigning. We find that, as expected, the closer a member feels to their local party in left-right terms, the more likely he or she is to participate in offline campaigning (H3a accepted). Offline participation is also more likely if the member has a positive impression (ie, as united, friendly and interesting) of the local party (H3b confirmed). Moreover, offline campaign activity is spurred if a member has been recruited directly by the local party (H3c confirmed), as opposed to the national party or joining of one's one volition.
Finally, as hypothesised, constituency marginality does play an important role for major parties: all else being equal, the smaller the majority achieved by their local MP in 2010, the more members of the Labour and Conservative parties did in terms of offline activity during the 2015 campaign. The marginality effect is not significant for smaller parties (H2d confirmed).
In so far as online participation is concerned (Model 3b), we can see that, as expected, after controlling for demographic effects and offline participation, these local factors do not exert the same impact as they do on offline participation. Their influence is either non-significant (in the case of ideological congruence with the local party or constituency marginality), or (in the case of having been recruited by the local party) negative. The only exception is that a positive impression of the local party has a positive impact on online activism.
Finally, when we run the national and local factors together, we find that offline participation (Model 4a) is significantly enhanced by the following: selfpositioning as an ideological radical compared to the national party, while retaining a sense of proximity to the local party; being recruited via the local party; having positive attitudes towards the local party; and living in a competitive constituency if one is a member of one of the two biggest parties.
Thus, the only difference from previous models is that, once we include local factors in the model, the view of the national leadership is no longer a significant driver of campaign participation. For online participation, previous findings are confirmed: self-perceived ideological radicalism, not being recruited via the local party, positive attitudes towards the local party, and positive attitudes towards the party leader are all factors that tend to increase a member's participation online.
H4 states that 'National Factors will be stronger in predicting online participation, whereas the Local Factors will be more useful in predicting offline participation'. Is this true? Not completely. For offline campaigning, two of the three national factor predictors have the expected effects, but the same can be said for online campaigning. The picture is clearer once we look at local factors, since all four of these are significant drivers of offline activity, but only two of them are significant drivers of online activity. We can, therefore, partially accept -or rather redefine -H4: whereas local factors play a bigger role in explaining offline participation, national factors play an important role in explaining both online and offline participation. 9 
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Conclusion
At the outset of this paper, we set out two key questions to be addressed: How well does the General Incentives Model perform in the 21 st century in predicting campaign activity both offline and, more innovatively, online? Over and above the GIM, do national and local factors further help explain activism, and if so, do the effects differ significantly for online and offline activism? We are now in a position to answer these questions.
With respect to the former question, our models suggest that General Incentives theory should remain central to our understanding of offline participation, although the fact that collective incentives and altruism are no longer significant might invite further reflection on the changes that have impacted on party membership in the last few decades. In this regard, the general trend towards the individualization of society remarked on by sociologists such as Baumann (2000) , has found a certain counterpart in the organizational evolution of parties (Faucher, 2015) , including the British Labour Party, which has gradually shifted from a longstanding model of collective delegatory democracy to individual representation (Watts 2017) .
With respect to online participation, only a few of the factors included in the original General Incentives Model actually help to predict activism. This suggests the need for research into the causes of online participation that goes beyond what we have been able to investigate here with limited data.
Our paper also shows that, on the one hand, factors associated with the national parties improve our knowledge of participation by party members both offline and online. On the other hand, local party and constituency contextual factors add significant value to explanations of traditional offline activism. If an individual is recruited by his or her local party, becomes embedded within it as a social network, forms a positive impression of the way it conducts its business and feels comfortable with its general ideological outlook, he or she will be significantly more likely to campaign for it at election time -all the more so if this all happens to occur in a marginal constituency and he or she is a member of one of the major two parties. National party factors also seem to bear upon offline activism: being recruited via the national party disincentivizes offline participation, whereas feeling ideologically radical compared to the national party incentivizes it.
We can also confirm that, as for the General Incentives Model, the national and local factor effects do indeed differ in certain key respects for offline and online activism. In particular, the local factors that matter for offline participationsuch as a sense of ideological proximity to the local party and the electoral marginality of the constituency -do not carry any significant weight for online participation, whereas being recruited at the local level enhances offline but weakens online participation.
The last point provides a fascinating cue for future research, namely the need to explore the impact of local contextual factors on members' involvement in their party's campaigns, both at election times and between them -something that could profitably be investigated through qualitative as well as quantitative methods (Garland 2016a (Garland ,2016b . We also need to know more, particularly in this increasingly digital age, about the quality, scope and, indeed, the effect of members' involvement in their parties' online campaigns (see, for example, Ridge-Newman, 2014) . Certainly, more traditional offline campaign activities are by no means a thing of the past -and our research suggests that if parties want members to get involved in such activities, then they need to think very carefully before rushing into making recruitment and participation more national and more digital. How to get party members to support and complement their own, often centralized, capital-intensive, and carefullycontrolled online efforts -something that the British Labour Party seemed able to do in 2017 -will be something on which parties have to reflect carefully too. Note: All activities figures are percentages. Campaign activism index is based on an additive scale that runs from 0 (no activity during the election campaign) to 9 (maximal activity during the campaign, excluding "other"). All relationships between party and type of campaign activity reported in this table are significant at p<.001. Measures of association are Cramer's V except for that between party and Campaign Activism Index, for which Eta2 is used. the party member survey were identified from questions asking respondents if they were members of any of a list of large membership organisations, including the political parties. At the beginning of the fieldwork period some 8840
YouGov panellists who were party members were invited to take part in the poll, and 5696 respondents subsequently took part in the survey, effectively a response rate of 64.4%. Results reported in this article are not weighted in any way since there are no known official population parameters for the various party memberships. However, previous YouGov party membership surveys using unweighted data have generated predictions for party leadership contests that came very close to (that is within 1% of) the final official outcome, which gives us confidence in the quality of the data. problematic, given that each of the factor scores derives from analysis that takes into account all the activities, regardless of whether these are of the offline or online type.
6 Count variables can be modelled using either negative binomial regression or
Poisson regression. They both have the same mean structure, but negative binomial analysis also has an extra parameter (alpha) to model over-dispersion (i.e., when the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean). In our case, we run Poisson regression for the online dependent variable, whereas negative binomial regression is more appropriate in the offline dependent variable due to a significant over-dispersion in the political participation index (ie. alpha is non-zero) (Long & Freese 2006) .
